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GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND MICRO LENDING IN 
EMERGING MARKETS 
Nicolas A. LASH*, Bala BATAVIA** 
Abstract: Although microfinance institutions have expanded rapidly since 
their inception in 1983, their growth has varied substantially among 
countries. This study examines the impact of government expenditures, taxes 
and regulations on the volume of microcredit for 92 emerging market 
countries for the period 2000-2011.  The Index of Economic Freedom data is 
used as a proxy for government intervention while microcredit is represented 
alternatively by either the Gross Loan Portfolio Per-Capita or Penetration 
Index variables.    While excessive government intervention could potentially 
encourage more lending in the informal microfinance markets, our findings 
suggest that, for both credit variables, the net impact is to reduce 
microcredit. The variables appearing to be most responsible are business 
regulations, taxes, and corruption. Tests using subperiods and also with a 
dynamic version suggest that our model is quite robust. 
Keywords: Microfinance Institutions, Government Regulation, Emerging 
Markets 
JEL Classification: G21, G28, 016 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This study analyzes the impact of government macroeconomic policies and 
regulation on microfinance institution (MFI) lending. More precisely, this study 
investigates which specific components of government activity and regulations 
impact MFI lending and whether these effects facilitate or impede lending. As will 
be discussed, numerous studies have studied the impact of government policies and 
regulation on MFI sustainability, profitability, operating costs, and outreach.  
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This study, which builds upon previous research, instead looks at the impact 
of government policies and regulations on both the volume of micro lending as 
measured by the Gross Loan Portfolio Per-Capita (GLP), and also MFI market 
penetration, i.e., the number of microfinance borrowers per-capita, as estimated by 
the Penetration Index (PI). Given the importance of MFIs in funding small and 
medium size enterprises, it is essential for policymakers to know which areas of 
government activity and regulation nurture, and which deter, micro lending. The 
analysis is complicated by the possibility that while restrictive regulations might 
reduce MFI activity, they might also encourage a shift to informal markets – the 
domain of MFIs.  
Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the importance of 
small and medium-sized enterprises, Section 3 introduces our model, Section 4 
presents and analyzes our empirical results. 
2. MICROFINANCE'S CONTRIBUTION TO SMALL AND  
MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 
2.1. The importance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
Throughout the globe, small business plays an important role by providing 
employment and stimulating innovation.  In their study of developing countries, 
Ayyagari et al. (2014) find that small firms create most new jobs and have the 
highest employment growth. Moreover, while SMEs are sparse among transition 
countries, in the remaining developing countries, they account for most of the 
private sector and almost half of total employment. (Ayyagari et al (2007). 
Small business entrepreneurship may also foster innovation that Schumpeter 
(1934) believed was the major engine of economic growth and development. 
Innovation is increasingly viewed as a major contributor to economic performance, 
be it at the local or national level (Cumming et al., 2009). Beaugrand (2004, p. 12) 
asserts that “poor countries should stop concentrating on their traditional activities 
and… embrace a dynamic approach to economic growth. Development is foremost 
a process of transformation, or evolution.” He posits that in third world countries 
innovation is most likely to stem from individual, homegrown small businesses. In 
such countries, Armendariz and Morduch (2005), de Soto (2000), and Paulson and 
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Townsend (2004) have found considerable interest in small business.  Much of 
small business entrepreneurship takes place in the informal, non-banking, sector.   
2.2. Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) and Small Business 
Entrepreneurships 
Development and expansion of the financial sector, which reduce 
transactions costs by providing reliable and accessible information, have been 
found to contribute significantly in raising a country’s income level while reducing 
income inequality (Beck et al., 2007). However, de Soto (2000), Armendariz and 
Morduch (2005), and Paulson and Townsend (2004) found that funding constraints 
severely limited small firm creation and expansion. Small firms typically require 
micro-loans (usually ranging from $ 50 to $ 1,000 in emerging markets) to start 
and expand firms. Unable to secure funding elsewhere, they rely heavily on family 
and friends. In the U.S., it is estimated that two-thirds of their funding comes from 
these sources (Paulson and Townsend, 2004). Because of the high risk of 
unsecured loans and high operating costs of underwriting small loans particularly 
to those in rural areas, mainstream lending institutions, such as commercial banks, 
have typically avoided small loans to small firms.  
To meet this demand, beginning with 1983, microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
were established when Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank in Bangladesh lent 
the equivalent of $ 27 of their own money to a group of 42 women from villages. A 
startling result was the 100% repayment rate which triggered the global adoption of 
Grameen’s practice of group lending or joint liability.  Group lending has been 
credited for severely reducing both adverse selection and moral hazard risk thereby 
leading to lower risk premiums and loan rates. This success has led to an explosion 
of micro-lending. “If the growth of microfinance has demonstrated nothing else, 
large numbers of low-income borrowers can be served while achieving a 
remarkably high level of repayment. Billions of dollars in loans to more than two 
hundred million borrowers are outstanding, and data from top lenders show that 
that only 2-3 % of those are delinquent in recent years.” (Cull et al 2014 p.2). Yet, 
despite this rapid growth of microfinance, Crabb (2008) cites estimates that there 
are at least 1 billion potential customers that have yet to be served. 
The rapid growth of the MFI sector reflects the existence of the large role 
played by bottom-up, informal finance in the third world. For example, de Soto 
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(1989) found that in Peru 48 % of the economically active population, 60 % of all 
work hours, and 38.9 % of GDP emanated from the informal sector. Research in 
Latin America, Asia, and Africa also point to a very large informal sector (Woller 
and Woodworth 2001). Moreover, Vanroose (2008) has observed that MFI 
expansion has been much more extensive in some countries than others.  Honohan 
(2004) finds that microfinance development in the last couple of decades has been 
concentrated in a few large institutions in a few countries.  
3. THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT POLICY AND  
REGULATIONS ON MFI LENDING 
3.1. Government policy in microfinance 
MFIs’ rapid expansion has turned increasing attention to appropriate 
government policy and regulations. In particular, there has been rising interest in 
increasing MFI regulations and supervision. Governments have attempted for some 
time to support financial enterprises and reduce poverty through development 
banks, directing lending requirements for commercial banks and grants to NGOs, 
but generally without much success. “These efforts failed due, in large part, to low 
repayment rates, politically-motivated loan write-offs, and capture of subsidized 
credit by wealthy farmers.”  (Hubka and Zaidi (2005: 7). For example, in his study 
of Asian MFIs, McGuire (1999:721) observed that “India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka and Thailand all have unsustainable and / or unsuccessful mass programs, 
operated either through banks or by government agencies.”  In fact, Bird et al 
(2011) have found that government programs and regulations in Thailand have 
basically eliminated all private MFIs. 
In addition, not only were development banks unsuccessful in attaining their 
objectives, but their activities also increased income inequality and hindered the 
development of rural financial markets. (Gonzales-Vega 1977; Adams et al 1984)  
In the same vein, government-sponsored MFIs likely would enjoy subsidized 
funding that would result in a competitive advantage that could crowd out other 
MFIs.  Governments can also provide direct support to private MFIs but there 
would be the potential danger that such support could have political strings 
attached. Consequently, Hubka and Zaidi (2005:1) suggest that “ideally 
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governments should exit the microfinance sector.” Otherwise, they suggest that 
government-sponsored MFIs disclose their budgets and also lend only at market 
rates. They further recommend significant reductions or even elimination of 
prudential regulations for credit-only MFIs. The authors instead call upon 
governments to focus on providing constructive environments characterized by 
macroeconomic stability and developed infrastructure that reduce information and 
transactions costs, particularly in rural areas. Schreiner and Colombet (2001 and 
Yaron and McDonald (1997) also find infrastructure to be important for MFIs. 
Hubka and Zaidi further advocate the improvement of property rights including 
registration of assets especially for the poor.  
3.2. Regulations 
Traditionally, MFIs have been subject to less regulation than institutions in 
the formal banking sector.  Yet, given the rapid growth of microfinance and also 
the expansion of some MFIs into deposit taking, there has been an increased call 
for more regulations (Cull et al 2011).   Currently, many MFIs face both prudential 
and non-prudential regulation.  Prudential regulations and supervision are imposed 
to promote safety for depositors but are irrelevant for the large majority of credit-
only MFIs. These regulations are also designed to protect the financial system as a 
whole, but while they may be critical for large financial institutions, they are far 
less applicable for the majority of MFIs, who, because of their modest size, pose 
little systemic risk. Consequently, Hubka and Zaidi (2005), Hartarska and 
Nadolynyak (2007) among others, advocate the elimination of prudential 
regulations for MFIs. 
Non-prudential regulations already exist for many MFIs that, in 
addition to entry regulation also govern their operations and include issues 
such as consumer protection, fraud prevention, credit information services, 
interest rate limits, accounting requirements and foreign ownership 
limitations (Christen et al. 2000). Whatever their benefits, regulations, particularly 
prudential regulations, can result in very high costs especially for MFIs. In the US, 
regulatory costs are estimated around 12%-13% of the banks’ non-interest 
expenses (Thornton 1993; Elliehausen 1998).   
As Cull et al (2011) suggest, the costs could be significantly higher for MFIs 
who lack the size to exploit economies of scale.  For inexperienced MFIs, the 
Nicolas A. LASH, Bala BATAVIA 
 
14 
startup costs can be even higher. Christen and Rosenberg (2003) estimate the cost 
for MFIs at 5 % of the assets in the first year and 1 % or more afterwards. In 
addition, regulations require compliance which, in turn, require skilled, and 
therefore, expensive labour.  Given that Morduch (2000) estimates that only 1 % of 
MFIs are financially self-sufficient, the impact of any such cost increase could 
have major adverse effects.  
MFIs react by raising loan rates to pass onto borrowers some of the high 
costs of regulations (Ahlin et al 2010). Given the capital scarcity in many third 
world countries, higher rates might still be affordable for borrowers and are highly 
likely to be lower than those of alternative credit sources, such as money lenders.  
Cull et al (2006) found that up to a point MFIs charging higher loan rates had 
higher profits.  Yet, government-imposed interest rate ceilings combined with high 
regulatory costs could adversely affect MFIs.  Moreover, MFIs have been found to 
react to interest rate ceilings by increasing loan size thereby lending more to better-
off customers at the expense of low-income borrowers including women (Cull et 
al, 2011; Cull et al 2009). Thus, interest rate ceilings that are imposed to benefit the 
poorest of borrowers actually have the opposite effect.  Interest rate ceilings can 
also shrink the total amount of micro loans.  
Sometimes, regulations also include directed lending, or policy loans, but 
this could result in lower MFI profits and, as discussed previously in the example 
of development banks, it causes resource misallocation. There are yet other 
problems posed by regulations. It has been found that corruption is associated with 
the degree of regulation (Holcombe and Boudreaux 2015, Lash and Batavia 2013; 
Elliot 1997).  Bribes are sometimes a useful means of avoiding onerous 
regulations. Numerous studies, such as Manzetti and Blake (1996), found that 
extensive government control and regulation provide an environment ripe for 
corruption.   Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) point to the danger of regulatory 
capture whereby regulated MFIs may support government measures to keep out 
potential competitors. For example, in the U.S., community banks were alleged to 
have lobbied successfully previously to limit branching for precisely this reason.  
However, another way that regulations can impede microfinance is by making 
it more difficult for MFIs and small businesses alike to open a business.  The World 
Bank, in its annual series of Doing Business analyses the impact of government laws 
and regulations on the establishment, management and termination of businesses.  
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Such constraints have been found to impede entrepreneurship (Fonseca et al 2001) 
and so could reduce the demand for MFI loans.  
4. GOVERNMENT INFLUENCES ON MICROCREDIT  
IN EMERGING MARKETS  
4.1. The Gross Loan Portfolio Per-capita (GLP) and Penetration Index 
(PI) variables 
Despite the trend by MFIs to increasingly provide more deposit and 
insurance services, lending still dominates MFI lending and so is the focus of this 
study.  One direct measure is Gross Loan Portfolio Per-capita (GLP), where GLP is 
defined as “outstanding principal for all loans, including current, delinquent and 
restructured loans, but not loans that have been written off” (Mix Market 2013). 
Another measure is the Penetration Index (PI) which is the ratio of borrowers to the 
size of the population. Krauss et al (2012) point out that the PI is frequently 
considered as one of core performance indicators for the state of the microfinance 
industry though a standard definition has yet to be adopted. 
 The GLP variable directly measures the amount of funding made available 
whereas the PI may be a better measure of outreach. Krauss et al (2012) point out 
that the PI may sometimes overstate MFI lending because some borrowers who 
borrow from more than one institution may be double counted.  Unlike the PI, GLP 
incorporates average loan size. In our tests, we will use both GLP and PI as 
dependent variables to measure MFI lending. The correlation between these 
somewhat similar measures is 0.694. 
4.2. GLP AND PI: Regional Distribution of MFI Lending  
As cited earlier, MFI lending varies substantially throughout the world 
(Table 1). We divided the 92 economies into the following five groups: Latin 
America, Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, North Africa and 
the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  While microcredit has an important role 
to play in all economies, we narrow our focus to emerging economies where the 
attack on poverty is most critical.  Hence, in our sample we do not include wealthy, 
advanced countries (i.e. Western Europe is excluded altogether).   
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Table 1 shows that both the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region and the 
Latin America region have over six times the average GLP of both the North Africa 
and the Middle East region and the Sub-Saharan Africa region.  In the Middle East 
and North Africa, the Arab Spring of 2010 has caused severe disruptions to MFIs in 
terms of staffing, lending and loan collection (Djre et al, 2011). Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
relatively small amount of loans may be attributable to it having the lowest per capita 
income of all the regions.  Table 1 also shows that North Africa and the Middle East, 
along with Sub-Saharan Africa, have standard deviations that are only about one-
sixth of the other three regions.  This suggests that, in terms of loan size per capita, 
the countries of these two regions are decidedly more homogenous in MFI lending, 
as measured by GLP, than the other three regions.  
Table 1 Distribution of Gross Loan Portfolios Per-capita (GLP) by Region, 2000-2011 
Regions 
Average Gross Loan Portfolios 
per capita GLP 
Standard deviation 
Latin America 30.06 30.6 
Asia and the Pacific 16.17 34.97 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 34.97 37.39 
North Africa and Middle East 4.64 5.39 
Sub-Saharan Africa  4.26 5.73 
Source: Mix Market 
Table 2 presents the PI which uses the per capita numbers of borrowers’ to 
measure MFI activity.  The ranking changes somewhat but the Asian and Latin 
American regions continue to rank high while Sub-Saharan Africa remains at the 
bottom.  Asia clearly dominates the other four regions in outreach with over 85 % 
of its loans to women and over 75 % to rural borrowers (Microfinance Information 
Exchange 2013).  In sharp contrast, the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region is 
the only region with less than 50 % women borrowers. Furthemore, the loans of 
both North Africa and the Middle East (34 %) and Latin America (27 %), have far 
fewer loans to rural borrowers than the other three regions (Djre et al, 2011). As 
measured by the standard deviation, Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa and the 
Middle East again have the greatest homogeneity. 
Table 2 Distribution of Penetration Index (PI) by region in the period 2000-2011 
Regions 
Average Penetration  
Index*100 PI 
Standard deviation 
Latin America 2.200 2.204 




Average Penetration  
Index*100 PI 
Standard deviation 
Asia and the Pacific 4.190 4.358 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1.763 2.396 
North Africa and Middle East 1.79 1.216 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.841 0.749 
Source: Mix Market 
4.3. GLP AND PI:  Per capita income distribution of MFI Lending  
We also divided the 92 economies into three income groups:  upper-middle, 
lower-middle and low-Income.  We excluded the high-income group for the same 
reason we omitted Western Europe, namelythat our focus is on emerging 
economies. The economies are divided according to 2012 per capita gross national 
income.  As defined by the World Bank, the groups are: low-income ($ 1,035 or 
less). lower-middle income ($ 1,036-$ 4,085); uppermiddle income ($ 4,086-
$12,615) and highincome ($ 12,616 or more).  Among the income groups, Table 3 
shows that the lower-middle Income group has approximately three times the GLP 
of both the upper-middle income and low-income groups. Conceivably, this may 
reflect that the upper-middle income group, because of its relatively high income, 
has relatively better developed financial systems so that the need for informal 
finance is less critical. As for the low-income group, there may be some threshold 
level of infrastructure necessary before micro lending can truly hit its stride.  Yet, it 
may be difficult to generalize too much about individual economies in the upper-
middle income group as it clearly has the largest standard deviation. 
Table 3 Distribution of per capita gross loan portfolios (GLP)  
by income in the period 2000-2011 
Income Group 
Average Gross Loan Portfolios  
Per capita GLP 
Standard deviation 
Upper-Middle Income 11.048 14.57 
Lower-Middle Income 29.79 33.54 
Low-Income 9.53 23.66 
Source: World Bank, Mix Market  
Table 4 suggests that for PI, the difference in income groups is less pronounced 
than for GLP and also that the lower the per-capita income of a region, the higher the 
number of borrowers. Comparing the GLP and PI measures for the different income 
groups shows that the low-income group has the smallest average loan size perhaps 
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signifying that there is less money to lend.  Interestingly, whereas the low middle-
income group has the largest standard deviation in terms of GLP, it has the lowest in 
terms of PI, thereby, reflecting a large standard deviation in loan size.  
Table 4 Distribution by Income of Penetration Index (PI)in the period 2000-2011. 
Income Group Average Penetration Index*100 PI Standard deviation 
Upper-Middle Income 1.70 2.60 
Lower-Middle Income 1.83 1.90 
Low-Income 2.26 3.27 
Source: World Bank, Mix Market 
4.4. Independent Variables:  Per capita Income and  
Economic Freedom Variables 
As we have seen in the above section, there appears to be a relationship 
between per capita income and MFI lending.  Per capita income has figured 
prominently in a number of studies on MFIs. Vanroose (2002) found that 
microfinance has greater outreach in regions with high per capita income. In 
contrast, Honohan (2004) found that higher per capita income was associated 
with lower microcredit penetration.  Given the above evidence, we wish to 
investigate the impact of per capita income on MFI lending as measured by the 
GLP and PI measures. 
 In our tests for government economic intervention we also utilize nine 
variables from the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom (IEF).  
The IEF measures the degree to which markets are free from government 
intervention.  One of the most controversial issues in finance and economics 
regards the optimum level of, or freedom from, government intervention and 
regulation.  For example, in their literature review of 198 studies employing the 
Economic Freedom Index of the World as an independent variable, Hall and 
Lawson (2l014) find that over two-thirds of these studies found positive 
outcomes such as faster growth and higher income levels and less than 4 % found 
negative outcomes such as increased income inequality.  
This study leaves aside this important policy issue and focuses solely on 
whether, and how, government intervention influences MFIs. The IEF ranges 
from 100 (free) to 0 (repressed). We dropped the labour variable due to a lack of 
data prior to 2005.  We use the following nine remaining IEF variables:  business 
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freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, monetary 
freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights and freedom 
from corruption. 
Hermes and Meester (2011) have pointed out that the effect of macro 
variables upon MFI growth and development is not unambiguous. Accordingly, in 
introducing IEF variables it is important to note that their potential impact on MFI 
lending is not obvious. On the one hand, greater freedoms should establish an 
environment that would stimulate entrepreneurship and microfinance lending.  On 
the other, less freedom while oppressing business development might divert more 
to a less regulated, informal sector such as the microfinance market.  That is, there 
may be a countervailing effect.  
1. Business freedom is based on the World Bank’s annual reports of Doing 
Business and measures the ability to establish, manage and terminate a 
business unfettered by excessive government requirements, such as licensing 
and environmental, consumer safety and other regulations. In many 
countries, particularly those in the developing world, engaging in business 
requires numerous licenses and permits. A lack of such freedom could curb 
entrepreneurship and thus reduce the demand for funding from MFIs.  
However, it is also possible that too many restrictions could drive businesses 
underground where MFI funding would be available (e.g., Ahlin et al (2008).  
2. Trade freedom refers primarily to the absence of tariff and nontariff 
barriers. There are a number of restrictions that governments impose on 
international trade.  Crabb (2008) found that less trade freedom is associated 
with greater MFI sustainability.  
3. Fiscal freedom reflects freedom from fiscal burdens both in tax rate 
progressivity and also tax revenue as a percent of GDP.  Less fiscal freedom 
might curb business growth and development as pointed out in the World 
Bank’s Doing Business 2013 and thus have a negative impact on MFI 
lending   (Fisman and Svennson, 2007). Despite this, microfinance 
customers could be small enough that they could avoid some taxes.  If so, a 
heavy tax burden in the larger, more visible organized sector could divert 
more activity to the microfinance market. 
4. Government spending measures government consumption and transfers as 
a percentage of the economy and also government ownership of business and 
industries. For most governments, expenditure data includes local as well as 
federal government. Government spending could crowd out private markets 
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including those in the informal sector. Crabb’s results (2008) are consistent 
with this view.  On the other hand, some government spending could be 
spent on infrastructure which could improve access to rural microenterprises. 
Hubka and Zaidi (2005) who generally are quite critical of government 
intervention point out that are examples of positive effects from government 
microfinance such as Thailand’s Bank for Agriculture and Agriculture 
Cooperatives.  Furthermore, some government spending (e.g.: Bangladesh) 
has been utilized to fund MFIs (McGurie 1999).   
5. Monetary freedom combines measures of price stability with the absence of 
price controls. Numerous studies, including Goldfajn and Rigobon (2000),  
Rhyne (2001), Vander Weele and Markovich (2001), Cull et al (2011), point 
out the harmful effects of inflation on financial and MFI development. In 
contrast, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007:1217) found that “MFIs seem to 
have developed sufficient safeguards and perform successfully in highly 
inflationary environments.” Ahlin et al (2010) drew a similar conclusion 
though Vanroose (2008) did not find any statistically significant impact.  
6. Investment freedom refers to the absence of restrictions on capital flows, 
particularly foreign. There are numerous impediments for foreign business 
such as investment codes, unequal treatment under the law, and restrictions 
on investment, land ownership, and earnings repatriation. MFIs could be 
adversely affected by curbs on foreign equity holdings. 
7. Financial freedom measures the degree of independence from government 
ownership and financial regulation including selective credit controls. Such 
freedom could provide an environment that would encourage 
entrepreneurship and financial development, in both the formal and informal 
markets. Crabb’s results (2008) are consistent with this view.This also could 
be a case where financial constraints in the most visible sector would divert 
funding to the MFI sector.  
8. Property rights measures freedom from government influence over judicial 
decisions. The IEF measure includes legally and protected private property, 
commercial codes defining contracts, and unbiased enforcement.  It also 
assesses the likelihood of government expropriation of private property. The 
importance of private property rights has been emphasized by Hayek (1944) and 
de Soto (2000). Buckley (1997) has pointed out that the absence or weakness of 
property rights has been a major impediment to enterprise activities in Africa. 
However, while the above would imply that a lack of property rights would 
adversely affect MFIs, it has been pointed out by de Soto (2000) that 
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unreasonably time-consuming property registration procedures can drive 
business underground (, possibly to the MFI market).  In addition, Hermes and 
Meesters (2011) failed to find any significant statistical relationship between 
rule of law and the cost-efficiency of MFIs, while Crabb (2006) did not find a 
relationship between property rights and MFI sustainability. 
9. Freedom from corruption is derived primarily from Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index which measures the level of 
corruption for various countries.  The highest possible score is 100, indicating 
a very clean government with little corruption to 0 reflecting a highly corrupt 
government.  Corruption can impede economic development (Lash 2000) and 
can also impede small and medium-sized enterprise growth (Fisman and 
Svennson, 2007) and thus reduce demand for MFI services. Ahlin et al (2011: 
115) found evidence suggesting that corruption may impede MFIs “at least to 
start-up if not to subsequent growth.”  On the other hand, corruption may 
result in the countervailing effect, that is, businesses moving into the informal 
market thereby increasing demand for MFI services.  However, neither Crabb 
(2008), nor Hermes and Meesters (2011) found corruption to have a 
statistically significant impact on MFI performance.   
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. The Impact of Government Policies and Regulation on MFI 
Lending   
Our study used cross-section, annual data for 92 countries for the period 
2000-2011. Although this sample had a potential maximum of 1104 data points, 
missing data for some countries resulted in a sample size of 846 observations.  
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for all of the variables. We note that the 
dependent variables, GLP and PI have large coefficients of variation relative to the 
explanatory variables excepting GDP per-capita.  The regression model will 
investigate to what degree this variation in microcredit can be explained by GDP 
per-capita and IEF’s economic freedom variables. 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics:  Annual data 2000 to 2011 for 92 countries, for GDP 
per-capita and Economic Freedom Variables  
Variable N Average Standard Deviation Coefficient Of Variation 
Corruption 846 29.119 11.711 0.402 
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Variable N Average Standard Deviation Coefficient Of Variation 
Business freedom 846 58.264 11.690 0.201 
Trade freedom 846 66.626 13.303 0.200 
Fiscal freedom 846 76.440 9.7485 0.128 
Government spending 846 76.443 16.251 0.213 
Monetary freedom 846 73.238 10.890 0.149 
Investment freedom 846 48.203 16.162 0.335 
Finance 846 47.638 15.601 0.327 
Property rights 846 36.578 14.309 0.391 
Per capita GDP  846 1749.70 2002.600 1.145 
Per capita Gross Loan Portfolio  846 18.038 39.794 2.206 
Penetration Index 846 1.5028 2.350 1.564 
Sources:  Annual Reports:  World Bank, Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, Mix Market   
In our first test, we regressed the gross loan portfolio per capita variable 
(GLP) upon GDP per capita and nine components of the IEF excluding, as 
explained previously, the labour freedom measure.  Only the monetary freedom 
variable, which is closely related to inflation, was found to be insignificant.  This 
result is consistent with Vanroose’s findings (2008), but at odds with those who 
found inflation to be harmful (Rhyne (2001), Vander Weele and Markovich 
(2001)) and those who found it to be beneficial (Crabb (2008) and (Hartarska and 
Nadolynyak (2007)).  
We then ran a second set of regressions omitting the monetary freedom 
(inflation) variable and the results are presented in Table 6. R2 was 0.24 and seven 
variables were statistically significant at the 1 % level, while corruption and 
investment freedom were significant at the 5 % and 10 % level respectfully.  Six 
explanatory variables (business freedom, fiscal freedom (from taxes), financial 
freedom, freedom from corruption, investment freedom and trade freedom) had 
positive signs (higher IEF values) suggesting that less government intervention, 
lighter regulation,  less corruption, and lower taxes provide a business-friendly 
environment that encourages MFI lending. Our finding for the business freedom 
variable supports the World Bank’s (2013) thesis that regulations can discourage 
business development and is also consistent with Crabb’s (2008) results. Our 
results that taxes discourage MFI lending are consistent with Fisman and Svensson 
(2007).  Our findings that corruption impairs MFI lending conflicts with those of 
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Crabb (2008) and Hermes and Meesters (2011) but is consistent with those of 
Fisman and Svennson (2007) and also Ahlin et al (2011).  In addition, our result 
that trade freedom has a beneficial effect on MFI lending contrasts with Crabb 
(2008) who found it reduced MFI sustainability.    
Table 6 Regression of per capita Gross Loan Portfolio (GLP) on per capita Income and 
Index of Economic Freedom Variables for 92 Countries in the period 2000-2011 
Economic freedom and GDP Variables Coefficient t-ratio 
Business freedom 0.59 4.61 
Fiscal freedom 0.68 5.16 
Government - 0.38 4.85 
Financial freedom 0.43 4.35 
Property rights - 0.87 7.27 
Freedom from corruption 0.35 2.28 
Investment freedom 0.17 1.78 
Trade freedom 0.55 5.35 
Per capita GDP  00.3 4.24 
Constant -77.67 6.12 
R2 = 0.24  
Source: Annual Reports from the World Bank, Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, Mix Market 
In our analysis, property rights, government spending and per capita GDP 
had negative signs, suggesting that MFI lending benefited from weak property 
rights, more government spending, and a lower income population.  We find the 
negative sign of the property rights variable counter-intuitive as it contrasts with 
Hayek (1944) and Buckley (1997). A possible explanation might be the 
countervailing effect that an environment with weak property rights diverts 
businesses to the more informal, microfinance sector as De Soto (2000) has 
suggested. Our finding that more government spending encourages MFI lending 
may reflect governments providing MFI subsidies and building infrastructure.  
Spending on the road and transportation systems could allow financial institutions 
to reach rural communities. On the other hand, government spending may crowd 
out some private business activity and move such SMEs into informal markets 
where the MFIs operate. The negative relationship with per capita GDP is similar 
to Honohan’s findings (Honohan, 2004:6): “The results are consistent with the idea 
that the presence of a market for microfinance (e.g. many poor people) and good 
country institutions help the microfinance industry grow.” 
Nicolas A. LASH, Bala BATAVIA 
 
24 
With PI as the dependent variable we first ran a regression, removed the 
insignificant variables, and then ran a second regression (similar to the GLP tests.  
Table 7 shows that the PI results had less explanatory power than the GLP model 
as the R2 dropped from 0.24 to 0.14. Moreover, only seven, rather than nine, 
independent variables were statistically significant. The corruption and financial 
freedom variables were statistically significant at the 5 % level while the five (five 
what? the noun is missing!), including the monetary freedom variable, insignificant 
in the GLP tests, were significant at the 1 % level. Thus, price stability appears to 
have little impact on MFI loan volume, but results in a larger number of borrowers.  
The low nominal interest rates that normally accompany low inflation may be more 
important for borrowers (i.e. small entrepreneurs and farmers) than for lending 
institutions.  In other words, borrowers may be more susceptible to money illusion 
than lenders. While the signs of the coefficients for four variables were the same as 
those in the GLP regressions, three variables (government spending, investment 
freedom and trade freedom) were statistically insignificant.  Otherwise, the results 
are consistent with those for the GLP and suggest that MFI lending is enhanced by 
weak poverty rights, but repressed by regulatory constraints on business and 
financial activity, high taxes, and corruption.  These results build upon the findings 
of other studies which were reported in section 4.4. 
Table 7 Regression of Penetration Index (PI) on per capita income and Index of Economic 
Freedom Variables for 92 Countries for the period 2000-2011 
Economic freedom and GDP Variables Coefficient t-ratio 
Business freedom 0.03 3.40 
Fiscal freedom 0.05 6.08 
Monetary freedom 0.02 2.94 
Financial freedom 0.02 2.51 
Property rights -  0.04 5.91 
Freedom from corruption 0.02 2.28 
Per capita GDP  - 0002 4.56 
Constant - 4.83 6.96 
R2 = 0.14  
Source: Data from annual reports from the World Bank, the Heritage Foundation’s IEF and  
Mix Market  
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5.2. Robustness Check  
Since our model covers 11 years, including the financial crisis period of 2007-
2008, we wished to investigate the stability of our model for the entire period.  To do 
so, we employed a dynamic model to control for the influence of previous values of 
our dependent variables, GLP and PI. The empirical results are provided in Tables 8 
and 9. For both the GLP and PI models, the results are very similar to the original 
tests which did not include the lagged values presented in Tables 6 and 7. All the 
independent variables have the same signs and same levels of statistical significance.  
The lagged values for both GLP and PI are significant at the 1 % level. These 
findings suggest that the model is robust for the period considered.  
Table 8 Regression of per capita Gross Loan Portfolio (GLP) on per capita Income, Index 
of Economic Freedom Variables and lagged GLP for 92 Countries for the period 
2000-2011 
Economic Freedom and GDP Variables Coefficient t-ratio 
Business freedom 0.58 4.65 
Fiscal freedom 0.65 5.04 
Government -  0.31 3.97 
Financial freedom 0.46 4.62 
Property rights -  0.82 6.87 
Freedom from corruption 0.31 2.06 
Investment freedom 0.16 1.65 
Trade freedom 0.52 5.13 
Per capita GDP  00.3 4.26 
Lagged GLP  0.14 4.43 
Constant -   82.64 6.55 
R2 = 0.25 
Sources:  Data from annual reports from the World Bank, the Heritage Foundation’s IEF and Mix 
Market 
Table 9 Regression of Penetration Index (PI) on per capita income, Index of Economic 
Freedom Variables and lagged PI for 92 Countries for the period 2000-2011 
Economic freedom and GDP Variables Coefficient t-ratio 
Business freedom 0.03 3.38 
Fiscal freedom 0.05 6.46 
Monetary freedom 0.02 2.94 
Financial freedom 0.01 2.44 
Property rights -  0.04 5.66 
Freedom from corruption 0.02 2.23 
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Economic freedom and GDP Variables Coefficient t-ratio 
Per capita GDP  - 0002 4.77 
Lagged PI  0.11 3.27 
Constant - 5.07 6.26 
R2 = 0.15 
Sources: Data from annual reports from the World Bank, the Heritage Foundation’s IEF  
and Mix Market 
5.3. Impact of the Financial Crisis  
Although it had been believed that MFIs were largely sheltered from 
international and domestic economic shocks, the financial crisis beginning in late 
2007, triggering the great recession of 2008, was severe enough to sharply reduce 
the growth of the microcredit throughout the world (Di Bella 2001).  Hence, we 
further explored the impact of the financial crisis and its aftermath (2008-2011) 
upon our two lending models.  Given the shortness of the time period, especially 
2008 to 2011, our results should be interpreted with caution.  Nonetheless, the 
results suggest only minor differences from the results of our previous tests 
(Tables 10-13). 
Of the independent variables, GLP has 7 of 9 and PI has 6 of 7 that retain the 
same signs and are statistically significant at levels varying from 1 % to 10 % for 
both periods.  There is some variability, however, in the significance levels 
between the two periods. For GLP (Tables 10 and 12), the exceptions to the 
findings of the original model are for investment which is statistically insignificant 
in both periods, corruption which is insignificant in the first period, and trade 
which becomes insignificant in the second period.  Given the sharp reduction in 
global trade and investment during the crisis, it may not be surprising that there 
was a weakening of some relationships for loan volume (GLP). Tables 11 and 13 
show that for PI, business freedom is insignificant in the first period. It is puzzling 
that corruption is significant for PI in the first period but insignificant in the second 
period, while for GLP the results for corruption are precisely the opposite. Perhaps 
some of these discrepancies may be partially explained by the shortness of the time 
framework. Nonetheless, our findings point overall to the robustness of our model 
and, given the severity of the crisis, we might have anticipated an even greater 
impact on our model. 
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Table 10 Regression of per capita Gross Loan Portfolio (GLP)  on per-capita income and 
Index of Economic Freedom Variables for 92 Countries for the period 2000-2007 
Economic freedom and GDP variables Coefficient t-ratio 
Business freedom 0.19 1.76 
Fiscal freedom 0.37 3.97 
Government -  0.23 3.94 
Financial freedom 0.37 5.36 
Property rights -  0.49 5.84 
Freedom from corruption 0.15 1.48 
Investment freedom 0.05 0.70 
Trade freedom 0.27 3.78 
Per capita GDP  0.001 2.37 
Constant -32.31 3.42 
R2 = 0.21 
Source: Annual Reports: World Bank, Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom,  
Mix Market 
Table 11 Regression of Penetration Index (PI) on per capita Income and Index of 
Economic Freedom Variables for 92 Countries: 2000-2007 
Economic freedom and GDP variables Coefficient t-ratio 
Business freedom 0.01 0.10 
Fiscal freedom 0.04 4.34 
Monetary freedom 0.02 3.10 
Financial freedom 0.01 1.99 
Property rights -0.03 3.50 
Freedom from corruption 0.02 2.05 
Per capita GDP  -0.000 3.52 
Constant - 3.14 3.66 
R2 = 0.11   
Source: Annual Reports: World Bank, Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom,  
Mix Market 
Table 12 Regression of per capita Gross Loan Portfolio (GLP) on per capita income and 
the Index of Economic Freedom Variables for 92 Countries for the period 2008-2011 
Economic freedom variables Coefficient t-ratio 
Business freedom 0.72 2.77 
Fiscal freedom 0.98 2.68 
Government -0.59 3.13 
Financial freedom 1.17 3.98 
Property rights -1.57 3.88 
Freedom from corruption 1.23 2.10 
Investment freedom 0.30 1.26 
Trade freedom 0.02 0.06 
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Economic freedom variables Coefficient t-ratio 
Per capita GDP  0.005 2.90 
Constant -   86.47 2.49 
R2 = 0.28 
Source: Annual Reports: World Bank, Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom,  
Mix Market 
Table 13 Regression of Penetration Index (PI) on per capita income and Index of 
Economic Freedom Variables for 92 Countries for the period 2008-2011 
Economic freedom variables Coefficient t-ratio 
Business freedom 0.04 3.14 
Fiscal freedom 0.06 3.09 
Monetary freedom 0.04 2.00 
Financial freedom 0.03 2.08 
Property rights -  0.05 2.59 
Freedom from corruption 0.02 0.53 
Per capita GDP - 0002 2.73 
Constant - 7.52 3.80 
R2 = 0.18  
Source: Annual Reports: World Bank, Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, 
 Mix Market 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the rapid growth of MFIs and their extensive outreach, one billion 
people are still underserved (Crabb 2008).  Moreover, the growth and development 
of MFIs globally has been very uneven. Thus, there is a very important need for 
governments to undertake appropriate policies and regulatory measures that 
support, rather than discourage, MFI development. In sharp contrast to past statist 
policies, microfinance emphasizes a bottom-up, market orientation.  Numerous past 
studies cited previously found that regulation can be costly for MFIs given that the 
vast majority are not financially self-sufficient. Thus, much of the literature cited 
previously suggests that excessive regulations can impede both entrepreneurial 
development and micro lending.  Moreover, for the majority of small, credit-only 
MFIs, a case may be made for the complete elimination of costly prudential 
regulations. Nonetheless, plausibly corruption, inflation, taxes, and some 
regulations could actually trigger a countervailing incentive for businesses to shift 
to informal markets which are the domain of MFIs.  
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The goal of our study has been to identify which regulations along with 
factors such as government spending, taxes, corruption, property rights, 
inflation and regulation have a significant impact on microcredit as measured 
both by the per capita Gross Loan Portfolio (GLP) and the Penetration Index 
(PI). We were further interested in determining whether these factors would 
reduce or expand microcredit.  
Our empirical results, based on the observations for 92 countries for the 
2000-2011 period, find that taxes, corruption, inflation, and regulations on 
business, finance, investment and trade reduce MFI micro loans. These findings 
suggest that the direct impact of regulatory and other government policies in 
impeding MFI lending swamps any countervailing indirect effect of driving 
businesses into the informal credit market.  In our results, an exception may be that 
weak property rights encourage MFI lending. It is worth remarking also that when 
we test our model using a dynamic version, splitting the time framework in two 
subperiods (to account for the financial crisis), the results are very robust. 
To conclude, our findings suggest that government policies can play a 
positive role through well-designed government expenditures, such as on 
improving infrastructure, maintaining price stability and implementing strong anti-
corruption programs.  In addition, business and financial regulations should be 
subject to rigorous cost-benefit analysis to remove unnecessy burdensome 
regulations, thus following the advice provided by the World Bank (2004: xv), 
namely that “good regulation does not mean zero regulation…. The optimum 
amount of regulation is not none, but may be less than what is currently found in 
many countries, and especially poor ones…” This would appear to be especially 
true for micro financial institutions. 
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